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I.   Introduction and Background 
 
 A global consensus has emerged as to a set of general principles to which secured 
transactions law for personal property should adhere.  I refer to these as the Modern 
 3
Principles of Secured Transactions Law (or Modern Principles).1  The sources of the 
Modern Principles include UCC Article 92 and its many progeny, including the 2016 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions3 (UNCITRAL Model Law) and its 
antecedent UNCITRAL texts.4 This chapter seeks to situate the Modern Principles into 
the more general sphere of the transplantation of law from one system to another.  In 
particular, the chapter considers the adoption of the Modern Principles by States through 
the lens of the late Alan Watson’s pathbreaking book, Legal Transplants.5  Insights 
provided by Legal Transplants and its various adherents and critics offer an interesting 
and useful heuristic for examining the legal transplantation of the Modern Principles.6 
The process of enactment (or the failure to enact) Modern Principles-based laws 
plays a crucial role in transplantation.  That process must negotiate various political 
obstacles and incentives, such as the positions of organizations and individuals with 
entrenched interests, governmental encouragement and discouragement, attitudes of legal 
elites, and sometimes the fortuitous intervention of particular individuals who champion 
(or oppose) the reforms.  Moreover, an important focus for any analysis of transplantation 
of the Modern Principles is whether and to what extent laws embracing the Modern 
Principles, even if enacted, are actually used and accepted.  The same factors that have an 
impact on the success or failure of the enactment process also may influence 
transplantation through the post-enactment use and acceptance of such laws. 
 In a recent article I advocate studies that would take ‘a more systematic approach 
to the use—and memorialization in the literature—of experiences and lessons learned 
from work of individuals and organizations “on the ground” in the process of 
implementing [secured transactions law and insolvency law] reforms.’7  That article 
 
1 For an overview of the Modern Principles and their principal sources, see part II below. 
2 UCC Article 9 (Secured Transactions) (American Law Institute and Uniform Law Commission 2017). 
3 UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016) (UNCITRAL Model Law). 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.pdf.   
4 The Model Law was inspired by its predecessor, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 
(2007), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-
10English.pdf (‘UNCITRAL Legislative Guide’).  In July 2017 UNCITRAL approved the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Secured Transactions Guide to Enactment, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/MLST_Guide_to_enactment_E.pdf (‘UNCITRAL 
GTE’). 
5 A Watson, Legal Transplants:  An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens and London, University of 
Georgia Press, 1974, 2nd edn 1993).   
6 For an enlightening and important study that takes a different approach to the study of transplantation of 
the principles embedded in modern secured transactions laws, see RJ Wood, ‘Identifying Borrowed 
Sources in Secured Transactions Law Reform’ (unpublished manuscript on file with author).  Wood 
undertakes to ‘fingerprint’ personal property security legislation in jurisdictions around the globe to 
determine  ‘the extent to which the jurisdiction has borrowed from each of . . . three templates’—UCC 
Article 9, the Canada/New Zealand model, and the Model Law.  Professor Wood’s illuminating study will 
be a mandatory resource for the future examination and understanding of secured transactions law reforms.  
7 See CW Mooney Jr ‘Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement and Enforcement Mechanism:  A Closer 
Look at Global Modernization of Secured Transactions Laws’ (2018) 27 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice 673. 
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reaffirms earlier work that articulated the significant impact of insolvency law on the 
behaviour of market participants outside actual or anticipated insolvency proceedings and 
the important role of insolvency law (and the actual use of insolvency proceedings in a 
given market) on the effectiveness of secured transactions laws.8  It also elaborates on the 
crucial importance of private international law rules (ie, choice-of-law rules) for secured 
transactions.  And it argues that such rules are vital for the operation of secured 
transactions in the business credit markets and should be an integral part of the adoption 
and implementation of the Modern Principles. 
 While much of the discussion here may be applicable to consumer credit (ie, 
credit extended to natural persons for personal, family, or household purposes), the focus 
here is on the Modern Principles in the context of business credit.9  The studies that I 
propose derive from some hypotheses.  One is that incorporation of the Modern 
Principles into a State’s legal regime is a necessary—but not a sufficient—condition for a 
successful transplantation.  Rephrasing this hypotheses in a more familiar vernacular:  
putting the Modern Principles ‘on the books’ will have little or no impact if the system is 
not actually used.  Another is that successful transplantation of the Modern Principles 
into a given State’s laws may depend on (sometimes sui generis) adaptations of and 
adjustments to the legal environment and business credit markets of the adopting State as 
well as modifications of the substance of the Modern Principles themselves. 
 The adoption of the Modern Principles need not be seen as an ‘ultimate’ goal.  
Rather, it is adequate access to credit that holds the most promise for enhancing social 
welfare.  But access to credit does not necessarily depend on a market for secured credit 
(i.e., a market for credit which is conditional on the effective provision of collateral) or 
the adoption of the Modern Principles.  So an important goal should be not merely the 
adoption of the Modern Principles but the development and support for a robust market 
for credit and an assessment of whether and how adoption of the Modern Principles can 
facilitate such a market.  For example, if there exists a robust and accessible market for 
credit without collateral (or without the Modern Principles), then imposition of the 
Modern Principle legal regime may not have major, transformative effects on credit 
markets.  On the other hand, adoption of Modern Principles-based laws may offer 
substantial benefits aside from such material market effects.10 
 These qualifications notwithstanding, the ‘overall objective’ of the Modern 
Principles, as reflected by the Model Law and related UNCITRAL texts, ‘is to increase 
the availability and decrease the cost of credit by providing for an effective and efficient 
 
8 CW Mooney Jr, ‘Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement:  Insolvency-Related Provisions of the Cape 
Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol’ (2004) 13 International Insolvency Review, 27, 34-
39. 
9 As mentioned in ch 1, II, business credit is the focus of this book. 
10 See V below. 
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secured transactions law.’ 11   The same can be said of the Cape Town Convention 
(‘CTC’)12 and its Protocols.13  Several studies and overwhelming empirical evidence 
confirm that the CTC and Aircraft Protocol have fulfilled this objective.14  While the 
Aircraft Protocol may be sui generis in its strikingly demonstrable effects, the adoption of 
the UNCITRAL texts and the ongoing Modern Principles-influenced global reforms 
demonstrate that at least an important segment of expert opinion subscribes to the general 
effectiveness of Modern Principles-based laws for these purposes.  Consequently, this 
chapter proceeds on the general premise that adoption of the Modern Principles promotes 
social welfare as a general matter and is a worthy goal to be pursued.  But the adoption of 
the Modern Principles does not necessarily contemplate the enactment of any particular 
statutory text—whether that might be based on Article 9, the Model Law, or any other 
model or template. 
 Following this Introduction, part II outlines the substance of the Modern 
Principles and their antecedents.  Part III then summarizes relevant aspects of Watson’s 
Legal Transplants and the positions of some significant adherents and critics of his theses 
and conclusions.  It explains the potential relevance and utility of Watson’s historical 
perspectives for the practical context of transplantation of the Modern Principles.  With 
this background, part IV considers the transplantation of the Modern Principles from 
several of the most important perspectives, including the role of legal elites and legal 
culture, governmental and regulatory influences, opposition of entrenched interests, the 
role of insolvency law and proceedings, registration in public registries, descriptions of 
collateral in the context of registration and creation of security interests, and the market 
for business credit.  In particular, it addresses various impediments to the adoption of the 
Modern Principles by States, obstacles to the use and acceptance of Modern Principles-
 
11 UNCITRAL GTE II., para 4. 
12 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 2001, 2307 UNTS 285 (‘CTC’). 
13 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to 
Aircraft Equipment 2001, 2367 UNTS 517 (Aircraft Protocol).  Since entering into force on March1, 2006, 
the CTC and Aircraft Protocol have been adopted by 77 contracting States and one regional economic 
integration organization (European Union).  UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown, accessed 5 Jan. 2018).  The 
Protocols covering railway rolling stock and space assets are not yet in force.  These are the Luxembourg 
Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway 
Rolling Stock, 2007, 46 ILM 662; Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets (adopted 9 March 2012). A fourth Protocol covering 
mining, agricultural, and construction equipment has recently been adopted (see https://macprotocol.info  
See UNIDROIT, Report (Nov. 2017), https://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2017/study72k/cge02/s-
72k-cge02-report-e.pdf; see eg  R Goode, Official Commentary to the Convention on International Interests 
in Mobile Equipment and Protocol Thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, 2.1, at 13 (Rome: 
UNIDROIT, 3d edn 2013) (‘A sound, internationally adopted legal regime for security, title-retention and 
leasing interests will encourage the provision of finance and leasing and reduce its cost.’). 
14 CW Mooney Jr, ‘The Cape Town Convention’s Improbable-but-Possible Progeny Part Two:  Bilateral 
Investment Treaty-Like Enforcement Mechanism’ (2015) 55 Virginia Journal of International Law 451, 
454-58 (summarizing economic studies and CTC Discount, under which debtors located in CTC/Aircraft 
Protocol jurisdictions can receive substantial discounts on costs of financing). 
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based laws in the markets for business credit, and hurdles for both adoption and use.  Part 
V explains that the Modern Principles offer potential benefits other than the measurable 
expansion of access to credit and the lowering of the cost of credit, such as coherence, 
certainty, and ease of application and use.  This is an important consideration that 
generally has been overlooked or underappreciated.  Part VI then concludes the Chapter. 
 
II. The modern principles of secured transactions law 
  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law epitomizes the Modern Principles.  It is a relatively 
direct descendant of the Legislative Guide,15 UCC Article 916 and the various PPSAs 
adopted by Canadian Provinces.17  The Modern Principles are reflected as well in other 
model laws,18 in other secured transactions laws enacted by several States during recent 
years,19 and in laws that are currently being considered by other States.20  The Modern 
 
15 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. 
16 By any measure UCC Article 9 has been an enormously successful legislative achievement.  From its 
original promulgation in 1954 through several major revisions it has been adopted in all United States 
jurisdictions in substantially uniform fashion.  Significantly, Article 9’s principles have been emulated and 
adopted outside of the United States. This is evidenced by the influence of these principles on the laws 
actually adopted in other jurisdictions and on international harmonization efforts. 
17 See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (OPPSA). 
18 See, e.g., EBRD, Model Law on Secured Transactions (2004), 
http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/guides/model-law-on-secured-transactions.html; Organization of 
American States, Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions,  
https://www.oas.org/dil/Model_Law_on_Secured_Transactions.pdf. 
19 E.g., Colombia, Ley No.1676 del 20 de Agosto de 2014, Por la Cual se Promueve el Acceso al Crédito y 
se Dictan Normas sobre Garantías Mobiliarias; See Mayer Brown, ‘Colombia’s New Law on Security 
Interest over Movable Assets Comes into Effect’ (28 April 2014), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/4868229b-de56-4b53-8669-
a55fcfdd728a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/56e374b9-fab3-467f-b3b1-
aa1d67beafbb/Update_New_Regulations_Moveable_Assets_Colombia_0414.pdf; Jordan, Pakistan; E-Mail 
from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (June 18, 
2018, 03:01 EDT) (on file with author).  In Africa, reforms that have taken place based completely, or near 
completely, on the Modern Principles include those in Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, Rwanda 
and Zimbabwe.  Reform which partially reflects the Modern Principles has taken place in Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi and Ethiopia, see M. Dubovec & L. Gullifer, Secured Transactions Law Reform in Africa, 
ch. 2 (Hart 2019).  In Asia, Brunei (ch 16) and the Philippines (ch 11) have introduced reforms based on the 
Modern Principles, while other reforms eg India (ch 18) partially reflect them (for analysis, see ch 18 
(India) V. 
20 These states currently include, e.g., Bahrain, Bangladesh (see ch 17) Pakistan (see ch 19), Chile, 
Paraguay, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, and Tunisia.  E-Mail from Andres F. Martinez, Senior Financial Sector 
Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (July 1, 2017, 08:34 EDT) (on file with author); E-Mail 
from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (July 1, 2017, 
07:41 EDT) (on file with author); E-Mail from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World 
Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (June 18, 2018, 03:01 EDT) (on file with author). 
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Principles also are embodied in the enormously successful CTC and Aircraft Protocol as 
well as the other CTC Protocols.21 
 There is no definitive or ‘official’ version of the Modern Principles.  However, 
the Legislative Guide describes its “fundamental legal policies.”22  The EBRD and the 
WBG each has published their own synthesized and distilled versions as well.23  Based 
on the available statutory texts mentioned above as well as the Legislative Guide, WBG, 
and EBRD principles, I propose to include in the Modern Principles the following 
features:24   
(i) public notice as a general condition for third-party effectiveness 
(perfection), including (x) a grantor identifier-based registry for 
registration of notices of security interests, and (y) possession of tangible 
assets;  
 
(ii)  clear and easy to achieve methods for creation of security interests;  
 
(iii)  clear and predictable priority rules, including the general effectiveness of 
security interests in insolvency proceedings and priority of security 
interests over other interests;  
 
(iv) provision for effective enforcement of security interests following a 
debtor’s default, including extrajudicial enforcement;  
 
(v) availability of all types of personal property as collateral, including future 
assets securing future obligations;  
 
(vi) free assignability of receivables;  
 
(vii) comprehensive coverage of all forms of security devices;  
 
(viii) extension of security interests to the proceeds of collateral;  
 
 
21 Note, however, that although these instruments adopt an object-based registry rather than a grantor 
identifier-based registry, as contemplated by the Modern Principles.  See eg CTC art. 18 (registration 
requirements). 
22 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 22-26. 
23 EBRD, ‘Core Principles for a Secured Transactions Law’, https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/legal-
reform/access-to-finance/transactions.html (EBRD Principles); WBG, ‘Principles for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-world-bank-
principles-for-effective-insolvency-and-creditor-rights (WBG Principles).  Professor Wood also has 
summarized a set of ‘operational principles’ that ‘provide the foundational building blocks’ of secured 
transactions law reform.  RJ Wood, n xr above, 7. 
24 All of these principles are discussed and explained in great detail elsewhere.  See eg UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide. 
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(ix) the general acceptance of freedom of contract for inter-party relations;  
 
(x) general equality of treatment of creditors providing acquisition financing;  
 
(xi) clear private international law (choice-of-law) rules.   
 
Other important principles embraced by the Model Law and other modern iterations of 
secured transactions laws are implicit in and follow as a part of the policy penumbra of 
these features.25 
 
  
III. Legal transplantation:  Alan Watson’s Legal Transplants 
and its relevance for the modern principles 
 
 The analysis offered here draws on Watson’s Legal Transplants not as a ‘how to’ 
for transplanting law—which certainly was not Watson’s aspiration—but as a heuristic.  
The discussion aspires to offer a useful and accessible means of exploring legal 
transplantation in general and the transplantation of the Modern Principles in particular.  
Given this chapter’s premise that the successful transplantation of the Modern Principles 
is on balance beneficial, Watson provides insights on both the practical and theoretical 
planes.  It is important to bear in mind that a successful transplant would require not only 
the incorporation of the Modern Principles into the local law, typically by legislation, but 
the actual use and application of Modern Principles-based law in transactional settings.  
In particular, Watson’s work provides some guidance for areas of inquiry in future 
investigations of law reform processes.  Part IV considers these insights in addressing the 
challenges, successes, and failures of transplanting the most important elements of the 
Modern Principles. 
 Watson views comparative law as the ‘study of the relationship, above all the 
historical relationship, between legal systems or between rules of more than one 
system.’26  But the primary focus here is not the dissection of the discipline of 
comparative law but rather the process of transplantation of law to (ie the borrowing of 
 
25 I have not proposed to include as Modern Principles increasing access to credit and lowering the cost of 
credit, although these are included in both the EBRD and WBG Principles.  See EBRD Principle 1; WBG 
Principle A3.  Although these goals and aspirations of the Modern Principles certainly are important, 
adoption of the Modern Principles is not the exclusive means for achieving them.  Moreover, the Modern 
Principles may serve other purposes as well.  See part V below.  I propose to include in the Modern 
Principles only the relevant attributes of legal regimes.  The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide observes this 
distinction between the objectives of a secured transactions regime and the legal policies designed to 
achieve them.  See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 22. 
26 Watson, Legal Transplants, 9. 
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law by) a State.  Watson analyzes the historical instances of legal transplants throughout 
the world, from ancient Near Eastern provisions regarding a goring ox27 to Roman law in 
Scotland28 and Holland29 to English law in New Zealand.30  Watson makes the case—and 
makes it convincingly—that transplanting individual rules of law or larger parts of legal 
systems is extremely common, and that most changes in legal systems are the result of 
borrowing.31 
Watson contends that transplanting legal rules is socially easy—even with 
opposition from the legal establishment or the legislature.32  ‘[I]t remains true that legal 
rules move easily and are accepted into the system without too great difficulty . . . even 
when the rules come from a very different kind of system.’33  He concludes that legal 
rules are not usually ‘peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they . . . 
operate and also that this is not a matter for great concern.’34 Watson also emphasizes the 
overwhelming importance of authority for transplantation and for law generally.35  In 
examining a legal system’s receipt of a transplant Watson encourages attention to how a 
system diverges from other, donor systems, not to the overall system, in order to 
determine what led a State to voluntarily seek and adopt the transplant.36  Significantly, 
Watson questions the extent to which adjustments made by recipient States actually 
conform law to fit their particular situations, arguing that the more important point is ‘the 
psychological value of having [a State’s] . . . own legal system’.37 
It is not surprising that the book has been widely critiqued. Perhaps the most 
controversial aspects of Watson’s theories are his conclusion that transplanting laws is 
socially easy and his failure to consider social variables surrounding legal transplants.38  
Sir Otto Kahn-Freund in particular criticized Watson’s lack of concern with the society 
that generated the transplanted law.39  By only presenting individual instances of legal 
 
27 Ibid, 22. 
28 Ibid, 44. 
29 Ibid, 57.  
30 Ibid, 74.  
31 Ibid, 96. 
32 Ibid, 95. 
33 Ibid, 95-96.  He concludes that ‘it would be a relatively easy task to frame a basic code of private law to 
operate throughout, with each nation being left free to modify for itself any part it found not to its liking.’  
Ibid, 100-01. 
34 Ibid, 96. 
35 Ibid.  In support, Watson argues that reception is possible and easy even when the receiving society is 
less materially and culturally advanced, and that foreign law may be influential even when ‘totally 
misunderstood’.  Ibid., 99. 
36 Ibid, 97. 
37 Ibid, 101. 
38 Ibid, discussing R Seidman, ‘Book Review’ (1975) 55 Boston University Law Review 682, 682-83. 
39 O Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1.  Kahn-
Freund strongly disagreed with Watson’s conclusions about the ease of transplanting laws, and claimed that 
borrowing law required understanding of the system from which the rules were being borrowed.  Ibid; see J 
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transplants into recipient countries, Watson may not have captured the full picture.40  But 
Watson emphasized that it was primarily the idea of a foreign law that is being 
transplanted.41  Many scholars agree that for a legal transplant to ‘fit in’ with the 
importing system, that system will need to be adaptive and receptive to different 
socioeconomic conditions, which requires taking notice of social, economic, and cultural 
conditions in both the importing and donating country.42 
 Criticisms notwithstanding, Legal Transplants continues to have ‘legs’ in the 
world of comparative law.  Legal Transplants has been described as a ‘landmark book’ 
and a ‘“seminal” text’ of comparative law.43   For example, Meryl Dean has drawn upon 
Watson’s transplant theory but with refinements in her study of the jury trial in Japan.44  
In another refinement, Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt, in their study of the 
transplantation of the corporate director’s duty of loyalty from US law to Japanese law, 
argue that the success of a legal transplant turns on whether there is a ‘“fit” between the 
imported rule and the host environment’.45 
 The goal here is not a critique of Watson’s theory and methodology.  It is instead 
the use of Legal Transplants as a heuristic and metaphor for assessing the transplantation 
 
Cairns, ‘Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’ (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 637, 644-45. 
40 Watson, among other comparative law scholars, ‘missed an equally important phenomenon – the impact 
of the process on the “donor” country.’  F Foster, ‘American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror’ (2010) 94 
Minnesota Law Review 602, 607. 
41 Watson responded to Kahn-Freund: 
What, in my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems was an idea which 
could be transformed into part of the law of his country.  For this a systematic knowledge of the law or 
political structure of the donor system was not necessary, though a law reformer with such knowledge 
would be more efficient.  Successful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing was known of the 
political, social or economic context of the foreign law. 
A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79. 
42 W Shi, ‘Globalization and Indigenization: Legal Transplant of a Universal TRIPS Regime in a 
Multicultural World’ (2010) 47 American Business Law Journal 455, 456.  Inga Markovits has conceded 
that Watson is correct about the ease of legal transplants, but only in the case of self-executing law reforms 
that do not need popular approval or compliance to gain effect.  I Markovits, ‘Exporting Law Reform – But 
Will It Travel?’ (2004) 37 Cornell International Law Journal 95, 98. Generally, however, in her view these 
are not the type of laws in question, and most legal reforms require cooperation from the citizenry and 
cultural harmony between the donor and recipient to become effective. Ibid, 99. 
43 Cairns, 641-42. 
44 M Dean, ‘Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 570. 
45 H Kanda and C Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants:  The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese 
Corporate Law’ (2004) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 887, 891.  The authors view ‘success’ in 
this context as the ‘use of the imported legal rule in the same way that it is used in the home country, 
subject to adaptations to local conditions.’  Ibid, 890. ‘[F]ailure’ in their view ‘occurs when the imported 
rule is ignored by relevant actors in the host country, or the application and enforcement of the rule lead to 
unintended consequences.’  Ibid.  They explain:  ‘“Fit” might be thought of as having two components--
micro and macro. Micro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the preexisting legal infrastructure 
in the host country. Macro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the preexisting institutions of the 
political economy in the host country.’  Ibid, 891. 
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of the Modern Principles.  For example, Watson compares law to technology, offering the 
wheel as a useful metaphor.46   
IV. Transplantation (or not) of the modern principles in context 
 
 It seems abundantly clear that the Modern Principles can be successfully 
transplanted.  Adoptions in Canada and more recently in New Zealand and Australia, 
adoptions and introductions in other States,47 and the acceptance of the Modern 
Principles in various international harmonization projects (the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide and Model Law being the principle examples) and their ongoing influence on 
global reform efforts attest to this conclusion.  But what of the situations in which the 
Modern Principles have not been successfully transplanted notwithstanding efforts to do 
so?  And what of the situations in which substantial secured transactions law reforms 
have been made but which do not follow the Modern Principles?  And what of the 
situations in which no meaningful attempts have been made to reform secured 
transactions law, much less to embrace the Modern Principles?  This part explores some 
more and less successful aspects of the transplantation of the Modern Principles.  In 
considering secured transactions law reforms it may be useful to imagine Watson’s 
‘wheel’ metaphor in considering whether the Modern Principles offer a ‘fit’ for a 
recipient (or would-be recipient) State and in the assessment of local adaptations.48  For 
example, did a State ‘get’ the ‘idea’ of the Modern Principles to be transplanted?  And 
even if local adjustments are understandable from political and economic perspectives, 
are the local adjustments and the justifications for the adjustments coherent?  
 The discussion draws in part on the country-specific chapters in this volume.  It 
also is inspired and informed in by an ongoing research project that I am currently 
undertaking with two Japanese scholars.49  The project consists of a qualitative empirical 
 
46  Watson explained: 
[L]aw like technology is very much the fruit of human experience.  Just as very few people have thought of 
the wheel yet once invented its advantages can be seen and the wheel used by many, so important legal 
rules are invented by a few people or nations, and once invented their value can readily be appreciated, and 
the rules themselves adopted for the needs of many nations. 
Watson, Legal Transplants, 100.  It might be helpful to consider adaptations of the Modern Principles in 
light of examples of possible positive and negative adaptations of the wheel.  Positive examples are:  rubber 
tires (for smoothing out bumps), ball bearings (for relatively frictionless wheel rotation), and front-wheel 
steering mechanisms (for steering through easy, rounded turns).  Negative adaptations might include:  
substitution of a flat, sleigh-like skid (fine perhaps for ice or snow, but difficult for sand, rocks, or other 
rough surfaces), square or octagon wheels (possible to rotate, but bumpy and requiring much more power 
than round versions, and a log- or tube-shaped single wheel instead of two opposite-side wheels (rotation is 
adequate but heavy and involves much friction). 
47 See nn xr above. 
48 See text at note xr above. 
49 My co-investigators are Megumi Hara (Professor of Law, Gakushuin University Law School), and 
Kumiko Koens (Professor, Yamagata University Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Department of 
Public Policy and Social Studies). 
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study of business credit in Japan—the Japanese Business Credit Project (or ‘JBCP’)—
involving interviews of representatives of Japanese financial institutions, governmental 
bodies, and businesses as well as legal professionals such as practitioners and academics.  
Our goal is an assessment of Japanese markets for private business credit, including the 
Japanese laws that govern secured transactions in tangible movables (such as a firm’s 
inventory or business equipment) and claims (such as a firm’s accounts receivable) to 
secure extensions of business credit.  Among other aspects of the Japanese business credit 
market, the study investigates underlying causes of Japan’s failure to embrace Modern 
Principles.   
 This chapter also draws insight from invitational conferences on the coordination 
of global reforms of secured transactions laws held in February 2017 and October 2018.50  
Those conferences brought together individuals representing many of the most important 
organizations that work on reforms of secured transactions laws and insolvency laws.  
During the conferences several themes emerged.  One overarching theme was that 
enactment by a State of statutory reforms is insufficient of itself for successful 
implementation of a modern secured transactions law.  Another was that global reform 
efforts would benefit greatly from increased coordination among the various 
organizations involved with that work.  Examples of coordination failures abounded. 
Several problems associated with implementation of reforms were discussed.  For 
example, some States have received conflicting advice and have enacted secured 
transactions laws that are not sufficiently compatible with newly adopted insolvency 
laws.  Some advisors present States with very simple, streamlined versions of secured 
transactions laws that others consider hopelessly incomplete.  Other advisors favour more 
complete statutory approaches that some consider unnecessarily complex. 
A clear consensus emerged that an important but enormously challenging obstacle 
to reform is the need for capacity building—stimulation of the capacities of prospective 
debtors and creditors to usefully and profitably employ secured transactions law reforms.  
This would include steps such as consultations with and education of the various 
stakeholders affected by secured transactions laws as well as cultural shifts in relevant 
attitudes and social norms. 51   Of course, the foregoing offers only a taste of the 
discussions.  But a common thread appears to be that capacity building in various forms, 
including fundamental and structural changes in characteristics of credit markets and 
 
50 The 2017 Coordination Conference was held on February 9-10, 2017, at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Philadelphia, PA.  It was co-sponsored by the International Insolvency Institute (III), the 
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (now, Kozolchyk National Law Center (NatLaw)), and 
the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa.  The 2018 Coordination Conference 
was held in Madrid, October 16-17, 2018, co-sponsored by the III, NatLaw, and Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid. 
51 See eg N Cohen, ‘Capacity Building as a Key Determinant of Success in Secured Transactions Reform’, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/4thSecTrans/Presentations/2ContGonST2/COHEN_Colloqui
um_Presentation.pdf. 
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cultural and legal traditions and norms, are necessary conditions for successful 
implementation of modern secured transactions laws.  Enactment of statutory text, alone, 
often may be a necessary but insufficient step. 
 One theme of this chapter is to advocate for further and more rigorous empirical 
studies of secured transactions laws reforms.  It makes no claim to have developed a 
definitive set of conclusions about the transplantation of the Modern Principles.  But it 
does aspire instead to offer some useful guidance for the development of further 
investigation.  The following discussion in Subpart A addresses several challenges and 
obstacles to transplantation of law in general and of the Modern Principles in particular.  
These are impediments to the adoption of the Modern principles, to their effective use 
and implementation even if adopted, or to both their adoption and use.   Subpart B then 
turns to several components of the Modern Principles. It addresses the impact and role of 
the various obstacles to transplantation on these aspects of the Modern Principles.  
Drawing on part III, Subpart C offers a ‘Watsonesque’ perspective on transplantation of 
the Modern Principles.   
A.   Selected Challenges and Obstacles 
i. Impediments to Adoption of Modern Principles 
 
a) The Fallacy of Expertise 
   
     
 Before focusing on a taxonomy of more specific obstacles to the adoption of the 
Modern Principles and causes of relevant adjustments and deviations, it is useful to 
reflect on an overarching impediment.  I refer to this factor as the ‘Fallacy of Expertise’.  
It is based on an aggregation of anecdotal observations and experiences over several 
decades of involvement with commercial law reform efforts.  It may be stated as a simple 
syllogism relating to a proposal for a reform of legal rules from the perspective of a 
person (below, ‘I’) occupying a position of formal or informal influence and whose views 
are respected in the law reform process: 
 (i)  I exercise my expertise competently to recognize the need to improve 
the law and to propose any beneficial law reforms. 
 (ii)  I did not think of the proposed law reform. 
 (iii)  Therefore, the proposed law reform is not a good idea and should not 
be adopted. 
The problem with this silly little syllogism, of course, is that its first predicate 
incorporates the term ‘competently’—not ‘perfectly’.  It is all too rare an event for a 
relevant expert to respond to a proposal—no matter how sound—with something like:  
‘By golly, why didn’t I think of that?  What a great idea!’  Of course, no one actually 
‘admits’ reliance on the Fallacy.  Moreover, I have no doubt that the Fallacy may be most 
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influential on the behaviour of those who have no subjective consciousness of its 
operation and who, in the utmost good faith, rely on ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ 
argumentation, reasoning, and evidence.52  But most readers will easily recognize the 
Fallacy when they see it and appreciate its operative role in the process. 
    
b) Legal Elites, Legal Culture and Legal Concepts 
 
 In the realm of ‘technical’ aspects of private law doctrine—of which the Modern 
Principles would generally be considered a part—experts among the legal elites often are 
the most influential advisors and actors.  This is understandable and, in many respects, is 
a good thing.  Experts among the legal elites (experienced and successful practitioners 
and respected academics and judges) play an important role in adapting the prevailing 
‘legal culture’ and ‘legal concepts’ to reforms such as the Modern Principles and in 
making appropriate adjustments to those principles as well as reciprocal adjustments to 
the local legal culture and concepts.  Certainly such adaptations and adjustments may be 
beneficial and important conditions for successful transplantation.  And, as a practical 
(read: political) matter, support or opposition from the legal community may be the most 
important box to tick in the reform process.  But this necessarily means that the legal 
establishment also may be the most significant obstacle to reform.53 
 The role of the Fallacy of Expertise and the success or failure of resisting its 
influence may be most obvious and significant among the legal elites.  Legal 
establishments in general appear to harbour great scepticism of changes perceived to be 
fundamental,54 especially if advanced by ‘external’ sources.55  Reforms such as the 
Modern Principles are agnostic inasmuch as they tend to conflict with both civil and 
 
52 For example, consider Eric Berne’s metaphor in the context of script analysis of human behaviour: 
‘[M]ost people spend their time sitting in front of a player piano going like this with their fingers and 
saying, “How do you like the music I am making?”, under the delusion that they are making the music.’  E 
Berne, ‘Transcription of Eric Berne in Vienna, 1968 IV International Congress of Group Psychotherapy’ 
(1973) III Transactional Analysis Journal 63, 68.  The Fallacy sometimes may be a manifestation of the 
Dunning-Kruger effect:  ‘[W]hen people are incompetent in the strategies they adopt to achieve success and 
satisfaction, they suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate 
choices, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it.’  J Kruger and D Dunning, ‘Unskilled 
and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments’ (1999) 77 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1121. 
53 See  ch 8 (China) IVA and V (discussing resistance to revision of Civil Code and conservative attitude of 
civil law scholars and drafters); ch 14 (Thailand) IV B and V B. [23, 32-33] (discussing resistance to 
revision of Civil Code and Commercial Code); ch 13 (Taiwan) III B (conflicts with civil law traditions 
hinders reforms).  On the other hand, the need for more flexible systems of secured transactions has led to 
judicially sanctioned systems of title transfer security in Japan and South Korea.  See ch 10 (Japan) III A 
(ii)  (discussing jōto tanpo title transfer security); ch 12 (South Korea) II B (discussing yangdodambo title 
transfer security). 
54 See ibid. 
55 See ch 14 (Thailand)VA (discussing view that compliance with international standards is not an adequate 
basis for reform). 
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common law doctrines and traditions.56  However, legal elites in some jurisdictions are 
less accustomed than others to evaluating legal doctrine in terms of standards as specific 
as economic efficiency or as general as social welfare.  The ‘ought’ may be too often 
gleaned from the ‘is’.  ‘Reasons’ for resistance to reforms may be repeated over and over 
with little rigorous analysis or debate, forming a difficult-to-penetrate-and-rebut 
conventional wisdom.57  Moreover, the intensive study and analysis of legal doctrine—
whether in the civil or common law contexts—does not necessarily illuminate or lead to 
understanding of the operation of markets for business credit and the potential economic 
effects of reforms such as the Modern Principles. 
 The role of legal elites is, understandably and appropriately, most pronounced in 
their defense of (and resistance to modifications of) the local legal culture, and especially 
in relation to significant imbedded legal concepts.  Inasmuch as security rights as 
contemplated by the Modern Principles are proprietary (‘property’ or ‘real’ rights), 
doctrinal legal concepts such as the roles of ‘title’ are particularly resilient.58  These 
concepts may collide head-on with the Modern Principles in the process of 
transplantation (or not). 
 There are other bases for scepticism of positions taken by legal elites toward law 
reform proposals.  Practitioners and academics alike may have incentives to resist change.  
Practitioners, for example, may benefit professionally (preserving esteem and positions of 
respect—‘psychic income’) and financially from opposing reform and preserving the 
status quo.59  Imagine a secured transactions ‘regime’ that consists of a complex web of 
esoteric and highly conceptual doctrinal meanderings, pock-marked with forks in the road, 
detours, and barricades, the corpus of which is comprehensible only with the ‘benefit’ of 
circuitous and detail-laden (even pretentious) intellectual histories, which are often 
imbedded in lengthy reported judicial decisions that somehow manage to reach some 
results (notwithstanding internal inconsistencies and considerable indeterminacy) while 
reflecting little consensus.60  Such a regime may enshrine the demand for legal advice at 
every turn.  It would not be a mere coincidence that legal elites in a jurisdiction whose 
law might be so described would be quite resistant to efforts to adopt the Modern 
Principles, which would devalue their hard-earned knowledge and experience even 
though it would create net benefits for the society in general. 
 
56 See ch 7 (reform in civil law jurisdictions) and ch 16 (reform in common law jurisdictions) 
57 Consider reasons proffered for retaining existing systems under Singapore law, such as changes would 
require a “complete overhaul” and current law has “worked well.” See ch 20 (Singapore) , [19, 23].   
58 See ch 14 (Thailand) IVB and VB(i) (discussing the determination of third-party effects and strict 
standards of identification for property to be transferred) and IV B i, ii, and iii below. 
59 This account would be consistent, for example, with the persistence of the complex amalgam of 
common-law and statutory rules for secured transactions laws in Singapore.  See  ch 20 (Singapore) part 
IV] (outlining a trenchant critique of current law while concluding that major changes are unlikely).  
Compare the relative success of the reform in Pakistan and the proposed reform efforts in Bangladesh in an 
environment of similar English and common-law traditions.  See ch 19 (Pakistan) and ch 17 (Bangldesh). 
60 The style and structure of this sentence seeks to exemplify the point. 
 16
 Compare that scenario to the actual experience with the development of Article 9 
in the US.  I will be among the first to concede, lament, and assume part of the blame for 
the statute having grown to be far too complex and detailed.  But, ultimately, between the 
statutory text and the official commentary, it does provide accessible and relatively 
certain and reliable answers and guidance.  But the point to be made here relates to the 
role and approach of the legal elites.  The  organized bar, the various other law-reform 
oriented organizations, and the individual legal experts that have played a significant role 
in the development and advancement of Article 9 have consistently sought to foster a 
legal regime that provides clear results, a unitary approach to security devices, and 
simplified notice filing, while encouraging the use by the business community of 
standard forms without the need for day-to-day legal intervention.  Whether they 
succeeded perfectly is beside the point. The relevant legal elites sought to reduce the 
roles of legal experts in the operation, application, and understanding of secured credit 
transactions.61 
 Putting aside the self-interest of legal elites, their roles in the law reform process 
also may reflect the interests of their clients.  Of course, their clients are entitled to legal 
representation in advocating for their interests in the legislative and related processes.  
But the matter addressed here is the role of the legal elites who purport to be advocating 
for the public interest in their roles as legal experts.  What actually amounts to client 
advocacy might be mistaken—and sometimes may be intended to be so mistaken—for 
neutral and objective ‘expert’ opinions.  Perhaps even more insidious, legal elites may 
seek to protect their own professional and financial interests by claiming that they are 
advocating for a particular interest group, such as unsecured trade creditors. 
 
    
c) Missing Histories and Tilting at Windmills 
 
 Advocating for a change in law and offering a critique of current law often may 
be hindered by an inadequate record supporting the adoption of current law and past (and 
ongoing) rejection of reforms.  Flaws in the relevant reasoning and erroneous factual 
premises are difficult or impossible to assess and criticize in the absence of reliable 
records of the bases for past decisions and current positions of lawmakers.  And rebuttals 
of the bases for decisions suffer when the relevant evidence is anecdotal and suspect and 
the attribution to lawmakers is unproven.  One of the beauties of the harmonization 
process within international organizations (and the uniform law process in the United 
States) is the availability of reliable evidence of the debates, assumptions, reasoning, and 
 
61 I readily confess to some bias in the assessment. This experience with legal elites in the Article 9 context 
offers a stark contrast to the attitudes and behavior of the bar in the United States that specializes in real 
estate law.  In general the real estate bar tends to be absorbed with retaining state-by-state idiosyncratic 
discrepancies in doctrine and practice and, consequently, has been resistant to harmonization efforts. 
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decisions.  These inadequacies have been a recurring problem in our investigations on the 
JBCP. 
d) Opposition of Entrenched Interests 
 
 As with any proposal for a change in law, opposition to adoption of the Modern 
Principles can be expected from those whose interests align with retaining current law.62  
For example, the Modern Principles might be thought to encourage competition from 
foreign financers and non-bank lenders who might rely on secured lending to compete 
with local banks, whose ‘knowledge of the territory’ affords a competitive advantage in 
making unsecured loans.  Such local lenders with entrenched market positions may also 
be concerned about the Modern Principles’ facilitation of the creation and perfection of 
senior security interests in favour of other, potentially competing lenders.  Similarly, 
sellers and other financers of movables that rely on title reservation transactions, which 
are effective under existing local law without registration, also may resist and oppose the 
unified, functional approaches to security rights under which such title-based structures 
would be made effective against third parties only by registration.  The general point here 
is that financial market participants may view existing legal infrastructures as 
advantageous and legacy financers with substantial market shares under existing legal 
regimes may be reluctant to embrace change—even if adoption of the Modern Principles 
would benefit borrowers and the local economy more generally.63 
 
e)   Sui Generis, Fortuitous, and Hard‐to‐Classify  
        Factors 
 In some cases the outcome determinative factors in the law reform process may 
be difficult to characterize, random, or wholly fortuitous.  While the concerns addressed 
here are the impediments to law reforms, obviously such factors also may support the 
adoption of reforms as well.  One or more particularly influential individuals or 
organizations may take a strong position for or against reforms, which may or may not be 
based on sound policy arguments.64  Those advocating for changes in law would be well 
advised to be alert to these influences. 
 
 
62 See eg ch 14 Thailand IV B (i) (discussing opposition of banks to secured transactions reforms). 
63 Entrenched interests also may advocate for retention or adoption of provisions that would inhibit the use 
of secured credit, such as restrictions on the persons entitled to be secured creditors and restrictions on 
assignments of receivables.  See IIIBiv and vi below. 
64 I would note, by way of example, my own role in the development of law in the United States concerning 
intermediated securities.  See CW Mooney Jr, ‘The Roles of Individuals in UCC Reform:  Is The Uniform 
Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised UCC Article 8’ (2002) 27 Oklahoma City University Law 
Review 553.  Note also the role of David Allan in championing the Australian secured transactions law 
reform, see D. Brown, ‘Australian Secured Transactions Law Reform’ in L. Gullifer and O. Akseli (eds), 
Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policy and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Oregon 
2016) 146-7. 
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ii. Impediments to adoption of Modern Principles and use of Secured Credit  
 
Some factors may present obstacles to formal adoption of the Modern Principles and also 
may inhibit the extension of secured credit even after enactment of Modern Principles-
based laws. 
   
a) Governmental and Regulatory Influences 
 
 Governmental policies toward credit may have substantial negative (or positive) 
influences on the adoption of legislation incorporating the Modern Principles and on the 
extension of secured credit.  Prudential regulation of banks that allows a haircut on 
reserve requirements for secured loans is a prime example.65  In many jurisdictions the 
unavailability of such favourable treatment for loans secured by movables and 
receivables—which effectively treats such loans the same as unsecured loans for this 
purpose—imposes an obstacle to the adoption of the Modern Principles by denying these 
regulatory incentives.  That treatment also discourages the extension of secured credit, 
whether or not such reform legislation has been enacted.66   
 Governmental programmes that support small businesses through loan guarantees 
also may lessen the motivation that might otherwise exist to reform secured transactions 
law by reducing incentives and to extend secured credit.  The reduction of credit risk 
under such loan guarantee programmes diminishes the benefits to a creditor of taking 
collateral, especially if the credit risk can be reduced through loan guarantees at a lower 
cost than extending secured credit.67 
 On the other hand, adoption of the Modern Principles actually could enhance and 
complement these guarantee programmes.  To the extent that the guaranteed loans would 
require security through the operation of Modern Principles-based laws, losses arising out 
of borrower defaults—and the costs of such guarantee programmes—could be reduced.  
The guarantor could reduce or eliminate its losses to the extent that effective resort to the 
collateral were available.  Moreover, lenders would build capacity through their 
experiences of extending secured (and guaranteed) loans. 
 Governmental attitudes toward protections for consumers and natural persons 
more generally also may influence the use of secured credit.  An example is a restriction 
 
65 See eg G Castellano and M Dubovec, ‘Bridging the Gap:  The Regulatory Dimension of Secured 
Transactions Law Reforms’ (2017) 22 Uniform Law Review 663. 
66 Other regulatory treatment also may reduce incentives to take collateral.  For example, generous 
treatment with respect to the classification of bank loans as non-performing loans may reduce a bank’s 
motivation to treat a loan as in default and to commence enforcement steps. See T Hoshi, ‘The Hidden 
Risks in Japan’s Financial System’ (Dec. 2011) National Institute for Research Advancement, 
http://www.nira.or.jp/pdf/e_opinion4.pdf. 
67 See eg ch 10 (Japan) II; ch 13 (Taiwan) III B(discussing government supported guarantees). 
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on persons that are eligible to become a debtor or grantor under a secured transactions 
law or a law applicable to registration of security rights.68 
 
b)   Financing Patterns—E.g., Single, Dominant  
        Lenders versus Multiple Lenders 
 
 The first-to-register priority rule and the efficacy of broad collateral descriptions 
(e.g., ‘all inventory now owned or hereafter acquired by grantor’) permitted by the 
Modern Principles makes it possible for a single secured creditor to ‘lock in’ a priority 
position.  This aspect of the Modern Principles regime might cause resistance to its 
adoption by a jurisdiction in which it is customary for a business borrower to maintain 
relationships with several lenders of funds.  But resistance on that basis would be 
unjustified.  Multiple lenders of funds who might otherwise have equally ranking 
unsecured claims against a common debtor could, under an inter-creditor agreement, 
easily share in collateral as secured creditors under a first-to register priority scheme.69  
The purchase money security interest exception to the ‘first to file’ priority rule70 also 
facilitates diversity of financiers, since an acquisition financier can obtain limited super-
priority without an inter-creditor priority agreement.   Adoption of the Modern Principles 
need not necessarily lead to the prevalence of a single, dominant secured lender to a 
borrower. 
 
     
c) Infrequency of Priority Conflicts 
 
 In some jurisdictions priority conflicts—such as those involving a grantor’s 
wrongful creation of security rights in favor or more than one creditor—may be relatively 
rare.71  This might result from—and reflect—the ethical norms that prevail in the local 
legal and business cultures.  Such circumstances might support the view that a 
registration system providing for public notice of security rights and a corresponding 
first-to-register priority rule are not needed.  But the relative paucity of outright fraud 
does not demonstrate that a registration-priority system that provides certainty is not 
worthwhile and should be rejected.  This is especially so if the relevant market lacks a 
Modern Principles-based secured transactions legal regime and is one in which secured 
credit does not play a prominent role.  Although adoption of the Modern Principles in that 
 
68 See IIIBv below. 
69 For example, the creditors all could be named as secured creditors in the registration or an agent could be 
named as the secured creditor to hold collateral on behalf of all of the creditors. 
70 See ch 3 II A (iii) for a brief account of the purchase money security interest rule.  See also ch 4 VII. 
71 See for example, City of London Law Society, Financial Law Committee, Commentary to Draft Secured 
Transactions Code page 97, at http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/storage/2016/07/Draft-Secured-Transaction-
Code-Commentary-Discussion-draft-July-2016.pdf. 
 20
jurisdiction might not ‘revolutionize’ the credit markets, that would not of itself justify 
clinging to a creaky and complicated legal infrastructure that is otherwise problematic 
and that imposes unnecessary costs on the extension of secured business credit.72    
    
  
d) Market conditions 
 
Recall that the principal goals of a secured transactions law incorporating the Modern 
Principles are the increased availability and reduced costs of credit.73  In a market in 
which the cost of credit is extremely low and unsecured credit is perceived to be readily 
available, at first blush adopting the Modern Principles might offer little practical appeal.  
If the expenses attendant to providing collateral are perceived to be significant, such a 
change in law would be that much less attractive.  And for small loans to SME borrowers, 
such expenses would cause adoption of the Modern Principles to seem even less 
appealing.  But, of course, a low-interest-rate environment may not always remain such.  
Moreover, even under such market conditions there presumably would always be some 
subset of borrowers and situations in which personal property collateral would be 
necessary or beneficial.  Those borrowers and lenders could benefit greatly from laws 
that follow the Modern Principles. 
 
e) Reliance on Immovable/Real Property collateral 
    
 
 In a jurisdiction in which business loans typically are unsecured or collateralized 
by immovable (real) property, the impact of this circumstance on prospects for adopting 
the Modern Principles and for increased reliance on personal property collateral is similar 
to that of the low-cost, high-accessibility-of-credit market just described.  As explained 
there, however, adoption of the Modern Principles nonetheless could be a beneficial step 
for such a jurisdiction. 
 
   
iii. Impediments to the use of Secured Credit (under current legal systems 
and assuming adoption of Modern Principles) 
 
 The foregoing discussion considered some circumstances that may discourage 
extensions of secured credit even under a prevailing Modern Principles-based legal 
regime.  This discussion addresses additional impediments to the use of secured credit. 
 
72 See V below. 
73 See I above. 
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a) Stigma and reputational concerns of borrowers 
 
 In some jurisdictions there is a prevailing belief or assumption that obtaining 
credit secured by personal property creates a stigma; casting doubt on the financial 
stability of a borrower.74  It sometimes is observed that granting personal property 
collateral signals a ‘last resort’ for a financially troubled borrower.  Doubtless there is 
some truth to these characterizations in jurisdictions in which observations confirm this 
correlation in fact.  Although troubled firms sometimes (or often) provide personal 
property collateral, it does not follow that a firm that provides such collateral in fact is 
financially distressed.  At the margin, however, this potential stigma plausibly could 
dissuade a borrower from obtaining much needed credit if it were conditioned on 
providing personal property collateral.  Further study might shed light on the extent to 
which this ‘stigma’ concern merely reflects some vague sense of malaise perpetuated 
through repetition or actually is a material impediment to obtaining credit. 
 
b)   Valuation of Movables, Secondary Markets, and  
        Dispositions on Default:  Chicken or Egg? 
 
 Underlying the economic potential of the Modern Principles is the core idea that 
the value of collateral could be effectively applied toward satisfaction of a secured 
obligation upon a debtor’s default.  Lenders in some markets harbour substantial 
uncertainty about this key assumption, in particular with respect to movables collateral.  
For example, some bank lenders report that they lack (in-house) expertise for valuing 
movables and that, in any case, a thin secondary market for such collateral makes 
recoveries on default uncertain.75  Some of these lenders have no actual experience with 
enforcing security rights in movables following a default. 
 It is unsurprising that there would not be a robust secondary market for movables 
collateral following debtor defaults in jurisdiction in which loans secured by movables 
are, relatively speaking, infrequently made.  That is to say, a thin market may reflect, at 
least in material part, a thin market for movables-secured loans—thus presenting the 
‘chicken or egg’ conundrum. 
 
 
74 See ch 10 (Japan) VIII B (ii) (in relation to asset-based lending). 
75 See ch 10 (Japan) VIII A 
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c)   Role of Insolvency Law and Proceedings:   
      Use, Abstinence, Treatment of Secured Claims, Impact  
      on Secured Credit, and adjustments to insolvency laws 
 
 In a real sense the ‘acid test’ of security rights is the effectiveness of those rights 
in a debtor’s insolvency proceedings.76 As a practical matter such effectiveness may be 
the most important context of perfection (third-party effectiveness) of a security right.  
But the impact of insolvency effectiveness generally on security rights and of the details 
of the treatment of security rights in insolvency proceedings may extend beyond the 
actual treatment of actual security rights in actual insolvency proceedings.  The potential 
treatment serves to bolster the credit enhancing attributes of security rights by increasing 
the availability and lowering the costs of credit—precisely the principal goals of the 
Modern Principles.77 
  The treatment of security rights in insolvency proceedings may serve as an 
effective means of de facto enforcement.  Viewed ex ante, this perception supports the 
credit enhancement function of security rights and encourages extensions of secured 
credit.  For example, in the US financially distressed firms often are the subjects of 
Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.  Secured claims generally are honoured78 and 
secured creditors may proceed with relative confidence that their collateral will be 
accounted for and dealt with in a value-enhancing manner.   Collateral might be sold in a 
sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets as a going business.  The insolvency 
proceeding provides a forum and mechanism for the valuation and orderly treatment of 
secured claims.  Secured creditors expect collateral to be available, under court 
supervision, and subject to rules designed to protect collateral value.   In a jurisdiction in 
which resort to insolvency proceedings is not the norm for a financially distressed 
business debtor, considerable uncertainty may exist as to the prospective treatment of a 
secured creditor’s collateral following a debtor’s financial demise.79  When insolvency 
proceedings are the norm for business financial distress orderly dispositions may 
contribute to the development or maintenance of a robust secondary market for movables.  
In contrast to the situation in the US, this seems to be the case in Japan, where the 
incidence of formal insolvency proceedings for distressed debtors is quite small by 
 
76 See ch 5. 
77 See UNCITRAL GTE, quoted at fn 11 above; Mooney, ‘Enforcement’, fn 14 above; Mooney, ‘Credit 
Enhancement’, fn 7 above. 
78 Secured claims might be honored and respected in a variety of ways, such as by disclaimer or 
abandonment of collateral to permit enforcement by a creditor outside of an insolvency proceeding, 
supervised disposition of collateral in an insolvency proceeding, or valuation of collateral and a distribution 
of value under a plan of reorganization. 
79 See part IV A iii above (discussing valuation, secondary markets, and dispositions on default). 
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comparison.80    A robust market for disposition in insolvency proceedings may, in turn, 
benefit enforcement through dispositions of collateral outside of insolvency proceedings. 
 Finally, this discussion of insolvency law might well have been included under 
part IV A ii above,81 inasmuch as the insolvency law and related practices in a State also 
may represent an impediment to the State’s adoption of the Modern Principles.  For 
example, the ‘strong’ version of security rights under the Modern Principles might be of 
concern if the State’s insolvency law and practice were such that the combination of the 
two regimes would erect obstacles to rescue and rehabilitation of distressed debtors.  The 
more appropriate response to that situation would be to combine the adoption of a 
Modern Principles-based secured transactions law with adjustments in the State’s 
insolvency laws so as to be more compatible with rehabilitation.82 
     
d) Costs of use and compliance, including complexity 
 
Extensions of secured credit will be discouraged by a legal regime for secured 
transactions that is complex, expensive, and difficult to use.83  Examples of such 
obstacles are formalities such as collateral description requirements that are complex and 
require assistance by legal professionals for perfection and priority of security rights, a 
public registry that is inconvenient to access and imposes substantial fees for registrations, 
and regulatory constraints that result in significant expenses for valuations of collateral.  
Such flaws in the legal and regulatory infrastructure would be substantially ameliorated 
by the adoption of Modern Principles-based secured transactions laws. 
   
B. Selected Principles 
 
80 During the January-September 2018 period the number of court filings of business insolvency 
proceedings in Japan (an average of 685 filings per month) were about 9.13% of the number of filings in 
the United States (an average of 7,495 per month).  Trading Economics, Japan Bankruptcies, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/bankruptcies; Trading Economics, United States Bankruptcies, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/bankruptcies.   Compare the relative size of each country’s 
GDP for 2017, which (in billions of United States $) was 19,390.604 for the United States and $4,872.137 
for Japan (about 25.1% of the United States GDP).  The World Bank, GDP, Current US,    
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US. 
81 Impediments to adoption of Modern Principles and use of Secured Credit. 
82 [Possible xx to ch 5.] 
83 See ch 9 (Indonesia) III B (authorities’ formalistic approach and lack of clarity hinders use of current 
law), III D (iii) (use of notaries and formalities such as listing values and obligations causes confusion and 
unnecessary expense); See ch 12 South Korea IV (discussing complexities and costs of registration system 
including requirement that both parties apply, examination by registrar, and registration requirement upon 
creation, extinguishment, and other events). 
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 This subpart considers several of the Modern Principles as compared to the 
corresponding treatment (or lack of treatment) under secured transactions laws that 
persist unreformed or that have been adopted by selected States.  It considers the impact 
on these principles of the various challenges and obstacles to transplantation discussed in 
Subpart A. 
  
i. Comprehensive (functional) coverage of all forms of security rights 
 
The Modern Principles embrace a ‘functional, integrated and comprehensive regime’ for 
security rights.84  It follows that under the Modern Principles devices such as the 
retention of title by a seller and a transfer of title by a debtor to a creditor to secure an 
obligation are treated as security rights.  As such, they are subject to the other dimensions 
of the Modern Principles such as the requirements for creation and perfection and priority 
rules, discussed next.  It is unsurprising that this clash between substance and economic 
reality, as embraced by the Modern Principles, and entrenched form- and label-based 
characterizations would trigger shock and resistance from local interests, including legal 
elites.85  Legal experts are unlikely to enjoy seeing expertise developed over years of 
experience rendered obsolete (although change also may present new opportunities for 
the more ambitious and opportunistic).  But legal regimes should not exist and persist for 
the enjoyment and prosperity of legal elites. 
 Adoption of a functional, comprehensive regime for security rights also may 
attract opposition from those whose practices and business models would be adversely 
affected or, at least, inconvenienced (in particular by the imposition of a requirement for 
perfection by registration).86 
    
ii. Perfection by Registration and Priority Rules – in general 
  
The most instrumental of the Modern Principles are the provision for registration in a 
public registry as the principal method of achieving third-party effectiveness (i.e., 
perfection) and the corresponding first-to-register priority rule.  These rules directly 
confront—and would override—parallel rules typically found in both civil law and 
common law traditions.  For example, pledges of movables typically have required a 
delivery and assignments of money claims (receivables) generally have required 
 
84 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 57; see UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 1(1) (application of Model Law 
to security rights); 2(kk)(i) (definition of ‘security right’). 
85 See ch 14 (Thailand) IV B (i) and (ii) (discussing lack of understanding of why the failure to have an 
integrated system is problematic). 
86 See part IV B (ii) below. 
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notification to or an acknowledgment by the underlying obligor or other action with 
respect to the obligor87 
 Adoption of a system for public registration of transfers (or notices of transfers) 
for security as a method of third-party effectiveness is a good first step.  But that move 
would not alone meet the registration and priority standards contemplated by the Modern 
Principles.  For example, if the pre-existing methods of perfection (such as a notification 
to or acknowledgement by an obligor on receivables) that do not require delivery of 
actual possession or some other form of public notice are left intact and remain available, 
and if (under a first-in-time of transfer principle) an earlier transfer made effective under 
those methods takes priority over a transfer that is later registered, then the registration 
system falls short of the requirements of the Modern Principles.  Under such a structure, 
for example, a transferee who conducted a search of the registry and found no conflicting 
registration nonetheless would find its interest subordinated to an earlier-in-time 
(‘secret’) unregistered interest.  Such a registration and priority regime fails to satisfy the 
essential purpose of the perfection and priority rules embodied in the Modern Principles.  
Yet some states, including Japan and Korea, have quite consciously and purposefully 
adopted such a regime.88  That adaptation aptly fits the ‘square wheel’ paradigm. 
 Such a square wheel might be characterized as a ‘compromise’ between 
transplanting the Modern Principles (round wheel) and respect for and reliance solely on 
traditional methods of effective transfers (skids).  To be sure, it is an improvement.  This 
registration alternative, for example, would allow a transferee of a large number of 
receivables to ensure third-party effectiveness (in particular in the transferor’s insolvency 
proceeding) without the expense and delay of dealing with multiple obligors.  The 
approach also appeases the interests of those parties who wish to achieve third-party 
effectiveness while avoiding the expense of dealing with the registration system.  
Moreover, it may not deviate materially from the Modern Principles in practice.  For 
example, as discussed above,89 in a given market priority conflicts arising out of a 
transferor’s ‘double assignment’ or ‘double financing’ may be so rare that adopting a 
first-to-register priority rule would not produce material adverse effects.  Similarly, the 
adoption of square wheels (or no wheels) on a tiny island where walking is the principal 
means of transport may not present a serious practical problem.  Stated otherwise, in 
some cases the adoption of an absurd rule would do little damage.  Even so, it would 
remain an absurd rule. 
  
 
 
87 Although, under the common law, an assignment of receivables is valid even if the debtor is not notified, 
see ch 16 IV B. 
88 This generally describes the situation under Japanese and Korean law.  See ch 10 (Japan) V; ch 12 (South 
Korea) III C (ii).  See also Chapter 18 (India) IV F. 
89 See IV A (ii) (c) above. 
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iii. Registration (Notice Filing) and Creation: collateral descriptions 
  
Another pillar of the Modern Principles is the ‘notice filing’ aspect of a registration 
system.  The information to be contained in the registration notice need contain only the 
basic information concerning a security right sufficient to put a searcher on notice that the 
secured creditor may have a security right in the relevant asset.  In particular, the 
reference to the collateral in a notice need not be a detailed and specific.  As provided in 
the registry provisions of the Model Law, ‘[a] description that indicates that the 
encumbered assets consist of all of the grantor’s movable assets, or of all of the grantor’s 
movable assets within a generic category’ is adequate.90  So, for example, a reference to 
‘all inventory now owned or hereafter acquired by grantor’ would be adequate.  Such a 
general description also would be sufficient in a security agreement for purposes of 
creating a security right under the Model Law.91 
 This approach has been rejected by secured transactions legislation in some 
jurisdictions.92  In the case of Japan, one reason given for this rejection is curious.  
Requiring more specific descriptions for creation and registration of security rights by 
way of title transfers (jōto tanpo) is seen as a protection from so-called ‘over-
collateralization’.93  For registration of assignments of movables and claims, in order for 
an assignment to cover future, after-acquired property effectively, it is necessary to 
provide specificity such as by identifying the location of movables or the source of 
claims.94  Adoption of a standard permitting such broad descriptions would (the argument 
goes) facilitate the security transfer to a creditor of substantially all of a grantor’s assets.  
A specificity requirement makes such broad coverage more difficult (but presumably still 
possible) to achieve.  If virtually all of the assets of a grantor were covered by a security 
transfer, and if the obligation secured were relatively small compared to the value of the 
collateral, then the excess value of those assets would be essentially unavailable for use 
as collateral to secure credit from other creditors.95  Alternatively, if no such disparity 
between a secured obligation and collateral value exists, then it is argued that in some 
cases there might be virtually no free assets available for satisfaction of claims of other 
creditors in the case of the grantor’s insolvency. 
 Arguably implicit in this specificity requirement is the assumption that permitting 
an easily achieved broad coverage for a security transfer that could make the excess value 
 
90 UNCITRAL Model Law, Model Registry Provisions, Art 11. 
91 UNCITRAL Model Law Art 9(2). 
92 See, in relation to Japan,  Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the Civil Code Concerning the Perfection 
Requirements for the Assignment of Movables and Claims, Law No. 104 of 1998, as amended and renamed 
by Law No. 148 of 2004 (‘PRAMC’); ch 10 (Japan) VI. 
93 See ch 7, III D and ch 10 (Japan) VI C 
94 Ch 10 (Japan) VI.  In many cases it is necessary for a creditor to retain a judicial scrivener in order to 
ensure satisfaction of the description requirements, especially for future (after-acquired) assets. 
95 This is so in part because of the relatively weak position of junior creditors under the prevailing title 
transfer security arrangements in Japan. 
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so unavailable would not be in a grantor’s interest.  But why should it be assumed that a 
market failure exists or would exist that would lead a grantor to agree to such a security 
arrangement that would not be in its interest?  Similarly, why should it be assumed that it 
is necessary to restrict party autonomy by making it more expensive and cumbersome for 
a grantor to transfer interests in its property as it may choose?  Concrete evidence of the 
reasoning behind the specificity requirement, including answers to the questions just 
posed, would provide a useful baseline for advancing the debate.96 
 
   
iv. Secured creditor restrictions 
 
 An example of an entrenched interest opposition to the Modern Principles may be 
the adoption or retention of restrictions on the persons eligible to be a secured creditor 
and to hold security rights.  Such restrictions could inhibit the use of a secured 
transactions law, even if it embraced the Modern Principles.  Restricting the persons 
eligible to receive and hold security rights to entities with market power or that otherwise 
benefit from extending credit without relying on modern secured transactions laws could 
have adverse economic consequences.  Such restrictions could constrain (or fail to 
expand) the availability of credit or increase (or fail to reduce) the cost of credit.  
However, a State may have legitimate interests in regulating and licensing persons 
engaged in the extension of credit to the public.  Whether such limitations on holding 
security rights are unwise efforts to protect entrenched interests and market positions97 or 
legitimate exercises of regulatory power would depend on the relevant facts.  If the 
former, then such restrictions would implicitly contradict the underlying goals of the 
Modern Principles. 
 For example, limiting the extension of secured credit to bank lenders—i.e., 
deposit-taking institutions—would presumably fall outside of the legitimate regulation of 
the extensions of credit.  Whether or not a lender is also licensed as a bank (i.e., to take 
deposits) would not seem to have any bearing on protecting the public in the context of 
commercial loans.98  But legislation enacted in Thailand is not so restrictive.  It  limits the 
use of its secured transactions law to secured creditors that are ‘financial institution[s]’ or 
other persons or entities specified by ministerial regulations.99  But for present purposes 
 
96 See IV A(i)(c) above (discussing difficulties in rebutting arguments in favor of statutory treatment in the 
absence of authoritative evidence of reasoning and policies responsible for its adoption). 
97 See IV A (i)(d) above (discussing opposition to reforms by entrenched interests). 
98 If under a State’s regulatory structure only banks are licensed to make commercial loans, that might 
suggest the need for the State to provide for the licensing and regulation of non-bank lenders as a means of 
increasing the availability of business credit. 
99 Business Security Act, Sec. 7. ‘Financial institution’ refers to a financial institution according to the law 
governing financial institution business, a life-insurance or non-life insurance company, and a bank or a 
financial institution established under any specific law.  Ibid, Sec. 3.  Under the Ministerial Regulation on 
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the relevant point is that what might appear to be the exercise of legitimate regulation and 
supervision by a State might actually amount to the preservation of entrenched market 
positions that impedes the goals of the Modern Principles. 
   
v. Secured debtor restrictions 
 
 As discussed above, governmental approaches toward consumer and other natural 
person debtors may result in restrictions on the types of persons that could be debtors 
under the relevant secured transactions laws.100  As in the case of restricting eligible 
secured creditors, this could implicitly contradict the underlying goals of the Modern 
Principles to increase access to credit.101  Japan’s PRAMC provides for the use of the 
registration system for the perfection of assignments of title of movables and claims only 
for assignments made by ‘juridical persons’.102  This relegates assignments by natural 
persons to reliance on traditional Civil Code methods of third party effectiveness.  Many 
SMEs in Japan and, presumably, in other jurisdictions are owned and operated by natural 
persons as sole proprietorships and not as companies or other legal entities.  It follows 
that such restrictions that limit access to the use of secured transactions laws are likely 
also to limit access to credit, to increase the cost of credit, or both.103 
   
vi. Free assignability and anti‐assignment clauses 
 
 
Specifying the Types of Lender, the secured party may be a juristic person having the objective to involve 
in securitization, a trustee of a trust under the law governing trust for transactions in capital market, a 
securities firm, a mutual fund, a bondholders’ representative under the law governing securities and 
exchange, a juristic person operating a derivatives business, an asset management company, and a juristic 
person having the objective to conduct factoring business.  Business Security Act, B.E.2558, B.E.2559 
(2016).  Moreover, under the Ministerial Regulation on Specifying the Types of Lender under the Business 
Security Act No.2, B.E.2561 (2018), the secured creditor under the Business Security Act B.E. 2558 may 
be the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Industry Ministry dealing with the SMEs Civil 
Development Fund, a foreign commercial bank dealing with syndicated loans, a juristic person having the 
objective to involve in hire-purchase or leasing transactions, and a juristic person having the objective to 
involve in financing transactions.  See ch 14 (Thailand) IV B (i). A similar system applies in India (see ch 
18 IV A).   The Pakistan reformed law is limited in scope to financial institutions or a consortium of 
financial institutions, as defined in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, and 
does not, therefore, apply to supplier finance.  
100 See eg ch 8 (China) II A (discussion applicability of 2007 law for use by only certain debtors, resulting 
in fragmented system); the common law system which applied in Brunei before reform (ch 16 II B); IV A 
(ii)(a) above (discussing governmental and regulatory influences). 
101 See IV B (iv) above. 
102 PRAMC, Art. 1 (providing provisions for ‘perfection requirements for the assignment of movables and 
claims conducted by juridical persons.’  A ‘juridical person’ under Japanese law includes a company 
organized under the Companies Act.  Companies Act, Act No. 86 of July 26, 2005, Arts. 2(i) (defining 
‘Company’); 3 (company is a juridical person). 
103 Note that the UNCITRAL Model Law preserves the protections of parties to transactions for ‘personal, 
family or household purposes’ under other laws, but does not otherwise contemplate limiting its use by 
natural persons as debtors or grantors (art 1(5) 
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 Another manifestation of entrenched interest resistance to the Modern Principles 
is the retention of the legal effectiveness of an agreement between an obligor and an 
obligee on a money claim (receivable) that an assignment by the obligee is not 
effective.104  Major companies may have sufficient bargaining power to insist that such 
provisions are included in their supply contracts (as obligors), which relieves them of any 
responsibility to deal with assignees.105  On the other hand, one might think that bank 
lenders, who might be interested as prospective assignees, would support the free 
assignability in accordance with the Modern Principles.  But it also is plausible that some 
lenders might oppose free assignability out of concern that their borrowers might 
otherwise be more likely to assign receivables to other creditors. These lenders 
presumably would be motivated by an interest in preserving their market positions.  
Notwithstanding these potential concerns, Japan recently modified its law to provide that 
such anti-assignment clauses are ineffective to prevent a valid and enforceable 
assignment.106  However, such anti-assignment provisions remain effective as between 
the parties, to the end that an assignment would constitute a breach of contract by the 
assignor.  Thus, a significant disincentive remains to assignments of receivables subject 
to such anti-assignment provisions. 
   
vii. Enforcement following default 
 
 The powers typically associated with ‘title’ or ‘ownership’ of property lend 
themselves quite comfortably with the exercise of default remedies in secured 
transactions.  This may explain in part some States’ incentives to retain title-based 
secured transactions and to resist the comprehensive, functional scope of the Modern 
Principles.  This may be further encouraged by what are perceived as cumbersome 
procedural requirements for exercise of remedies under statutory schemes for pledges and 
mortgages.  But the Modern Principles embrace robust rights of enforcement.  There is no 
principled reason why resort to a title-based device necessarily would offer stronger 
remedies (although a creditor’s having ‘title’ may retain a strong intuitive appeal).  On 
the other hand, if the motivation for retaining title-based devices is to insulate a secured 
creditor from reasonable procedures to preserve any surplus value of collateral (i.e., in 
 
104 In Pakistan, inclusion in the Financial Institutions (Secured Transactions) Act 2016 of a provision 
overriding anti-assignment clauses was rejected on the grounds of interference with freedom of contract, 
see ch 19 (Pakistan) IV F. 
105 The policy underlying the free assignability of receivables recognizes that the benefits of facilitating 
such assignments drastically outweigh any risks and burdens of obligors. 
106 Law No. 44 of 2017 (effective April 1, 2020).  The new rule will apply to pre-existing contracts.  See ch 
10 (Japan) IV B (iii).   
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excess of the secured obligation) for the benefit of the debtor, the Modern Principles 
simply reject that approach as incoherent and penal.107 
  
C.   Some Watsonesque perspectives 
 The Modern Principles can be transplanted and received well by States that reflect 
a range of attributes, thus supporting the idea that they are eminently transplantable.  But 
questions remain as to the circumstances under which transplantation fails or is seriously 
incomplete or deviant.  Watson’s Legal Transplants may offer some useful insights as to 
appropriate areas of investigation and research.  In this respect it supports the thesis of 
this chapter that further understanding of law reform processes in general and in 
particular those dealing with secured transactions laws would benefit greatly from more 
rigorous empirical studies.  Our current work on the JBCP follows this path and we hope 
that it will be an exemplar for similar investigations. 
 The experience with transplantation of the Modern Principles provides some 
support for Watson’s claim that transplantation of legal rules may be ‘socially easy’.108  
This is reflected by their assimilation into a variety of legal cultures and societies.  But 
the deviations from the Modern Principles that States have made also evidence Watson’s 
appreciation that States make reforms to borrowed laws in the transplantation process.  
This preliminary examination of the transplantation of the Modern Principles may cast 
some doubt, at least in the present context, on Watson’s claim that adjustments do not 
conform the States’ particular circumstances (depending, admittedly, on what one 
considers to be relevant particular circumstances).  At least in this context of modern 
commercial law, the dominant influences of legal elites (broadly including not only the 
professionals but the legal culture and doctrinal and conceptual influences) and the 
political power of entrenched interests do appear to take account of a State’s specific 
situations.  But these adjustments to local circumstances (or selective rejections of the 
Modern Principles) are not necessarily socially beneficial, especially when these two 
important influences converge. 
 Japan’s ‘square wheel’ adaptation of the registration and priority aspects of the 
Modern Principles reflects a failure even to incorporate the basic ‘idea’, much less the 
details, of a first-to-register priority rule.109  But it may well reflect only a ‘split the 
difference’ compromise among various competing local interests—including legal 
 
107 Of course, a title-based security device need not run afoul of such debtor protections.  For example, the 
judicially approved title-transfer security device in Japan (jōto tanpo) recognizes a debtor’s entitlement to 
the surplus value and even recognizes the possibility of creating junior title-transfer security rights.  See ch 
10 (Japan) III A (ii)(a). 
108 See III above. 
109 See IV B (ii) above. 
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elites—which a political process failed to resolve in a principled way.  Similarly, efforts 
of commercial lenders to protect entrenched market positions, such as resistance to the 
effectiveness of anti-assignment provisions, also may reflect an adaptation to the 
particulars of local circumstances.110  But those ‘particulars’ might be nothing more that 
the protection of a dominant market position.   That is not necessarily a ‘cultural 
adjustment’ worthy of our applause and respect. 
 Perhaps Watson’s most compelling claim is that virtually all law is borrowed.  
Yet one might quite plausibly wonder, for example, how the rather complete reception by 
Holland of Roman law by the 17th century may be relevant to the transplantation of the 
Modern Principles in the 21st century. 111   On the other hand, Watson’s explanation of 
the more or less fortuitous borrowing of Ulrich Huber’s teachings on conflict of laws in 
the early development of laws in the United States seems no less apt when considering 
transplantation of the Modern Principles.112  This borrowing appears to have resulted 
primarily from the availability of the source and not from any similarity or other affinity 
between the donor(s) and the recipient.113 
 The borrowing phenomenon invites some interesting reflections on the 
development of the Modern Principles, and in particular the development of UCC Article 
9.  To be sure, UCC Article 9 borrowed from ideas developed in the United States and 
elsewhere concerning secured commercial financing transactions.  But it also offered a 
new, sui generis and holistic approach that has inspired and found its way into the 
Modern Principles and into the laws of numerous States.  UCC Article 9 fundamentally 
rejected common law ideas about nonpossessory security.  It addressed concerns about 
fraud (and to a lesser extent, ostensible ownership) by offering as an antidote a simple 
notice-filing system for public notice.  It rejected the ‘principle’ that still prevails in some 
common-law jurisdictions that even if a transaction walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, 
and looks like a duck, it is a chicken if the parties so name it—e.g., title reservation 
transactions.114 
 A relatively small group of scholars and practitioners bore the responsibility, and 
deserves the credit, for the successful emergence of UCC Article 9.  It was necessary (not 
only for Article 9 but for the development of the UCC as a whole) to overcome 
 
110See IV B (vi) above. 
111 Watson, Legal Transplants, 57. 
112 Ibid, 109-110.  Watson described how early law in the United States borrowed Huber’s axioms from 
England, which was influenced by the high regard for Huber in Scotland (through the influence of Lord 
Mansfield, a Scot), which in turn had been influenced by Dutch law.  As Watson explained:  
What most concerns us here is that, on an issue so vital to the well-being of the United States and 
its citizens, there was for so long no societal input into the basic principles, and even the judges, as 
subordinate lawmakers, gave credence to particular foreign authority with no apparent interest in 
alternative approaches. 
Ibid. 109. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See ch 16 IV C. 
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substantial opposition from powerful circles.115  These efforts benefited from the 
prevailing uniform law process in the United States, which removed the project from the 
usual political environment of the legislative processes.  Alas, that is a luxury that is not 
available in most States. 
 
D.   Overcoming Obstacles 
 The foregoing discussion of challenges and obstacles to the adoption of Modern 
Principles and the use of secured credit also provides a roadmap of sorts for steps and 
strategies for overcoming or reducing these impediments.  This subpart identifies 
examples of positive approaches for overcoming obstacles and advancing the adoption 
and use.   
i. Capacity Building 
 
 The need for capacity building was an important theme that emerged from the 
coordination conferences.116  Efforts directed to developing debtor and creditor capacities 
to understand and utilize secured transactions could meaningfully address many of the 
challenges to the adoption of the Modern Principles as well as the effective extensions of 
secured credit.117  For example, a widespread appreciation of the benefits of secured 
credit could reduce or eliminate the stigma sometimes associated with security.118  
Similarly, education and training of credit personnel and the development of secondary 
markets for movables could address valuation problems that inhibit the development of 
secured credit markets.119 
   
 
115 Consider the comments of Professor Grant Gilmore, during the review of the UCC by the New York 
Law Revision Commission, at a public hearing: 
The memoranda read this morning on behalf of the New York Clearing House . . . were so riddled with 
mistakes, inaccuracies, misreadings and misconstructions as to be largely untrustworthy and as to throw 
grave doubt on the professional competence in this field of those who prepared the memoranda. It cannot 
be overlooked that these memoranda were submitted to this Commission by representatives of some of the 
largest banks in New York City, advised presumably by competent counsel. These are harsh words, 
deliberately chosen, which I shall be prepared to document before you gentlemen tomorrow. 
2 New York Law Revision Commission, Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 1161 (1954). 
116 See IV above.  
117 See, for example, ch 9 (Indonesia) III A (many stakeholders still do not fully understand 1999 law so 
‘implementation is patchy and rife with issues’); ch 12 (South Korea) V (ineffectiveness of current secured 
transactions law resulting from business parties’ unfamiliarity with law, lack of movables valuation 
techniques and data on valuation, and paucity of expertise on management and maintenance of collateral); 
Ch 14 (Thailand) IV B (i) and (ii) (failure to understand need for an integrated system for secured 
transactions); ch 15 Vietnam IV (International Finance Corporation work with Viet Nam Banks’ 
Association on capacity building for banking sector).. 
118 See IV A (iii)(a) above. 
119 See IV A (iii) (b) above. 
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ii. Incentives eg World Bank ‘Doing Business’ rankings 
 
 The economic benefits that may result from a State’s adoption of a Modern 
Principles-based secured transactions law provide tangible incentives for reform.  
Another, less tangible but important, incentive may arise from a State’s desire to improve 
a its rankings in the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report.120  In the context of 
secured transactions law reforms the rankings on the strength of legal rights in connection 
with getting credit are particularly significant.121  While these rankings have been 
subjected to considerable (and well-deserved) criticism,122 it is clear enough that 
improving a State’s ranking has provided a meaningful incentive for reform.123 
   
iii. Promotion and coordination 
 
 Finally, the past and ongoing work of the many organizations and individuals in 
the implementation of secured transactions law reforms deserve much credit for the 
progress to date.  Many of these were represented at the 2017 and 2018 coordination 
conferences.124  One hopes that the current efforts to provide enhanced coordination of 
these efforts will provide even more success in the future. 
 
V.   Benefits of Modern Principles: beyond credit enhancement 
 
The potential benefits of adopting the Modern Principles extend beyond the prospects for 
increasing access to and lowering the cost of credit.   Indeed, in some markets prevailing 
conditions, such as exceedingly low interest rates and the prevalence, convenience, and 
financial rewards of government-sponsored guarantees, might substantially blunt those 
credit enhancement attributes of a Modern Principles-based secured transactions law.  
 
120 For the most recent report, see World Bank Group, Doing Business 2019 (16th edn), 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-
report_web-version.pdf. 
121 See ibid, 95 (‘The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending ... .’).  For the rankings in the 
2019 report (based on May 1, 2018 data), see World Bank Group, Rankings and Ease of Doing Business 
Score, http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings. 
122 See eg Oakland Institute, It is Time to End the Business Rankings of the World Bank (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/it-time-end-business-rankings-world-bank. 
123 As reported by the WBG, ‘Since its launch in 2003, Doing Business has inspired more than 3,500 
reforms in the 10 areas of business regulation measured by the report.’  Doing Business 2019, fn 121 above, 
vi; see also eg ch 13 (Taiwan) I, III A and B, IV A (iii)  (discussing influence of WBG Doing Business 
Survey); ch 14 (Thailand) I, V A (same); ch 16 II A (Brunei’s secured transactions law reforms were 
intended to move Brunei up the Doing Business rankings and, indeed, achieved that goal).  
124 See IV above 
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But even in the absence of any demonstrable and measurable macroeconomic impact of 
credit enhancement, there is much to commend the adoption of such reforms. 
 A Modern Principles-based law offers many laudable attributes—coherence, 
relative simplicity, certainty, transparency, and user-friendliness.  This is especially so 
when compared to the balkanized taxonomies of security devices under both common-
law and civil-law traditions.  These attributes reflected by the Modern Principles typically 
are central aspirations of law reform.  Yet these advantages appear to occupy a reduced 
and subservient status when compared to the more visible and frequently touted goal of 
economic growth through enhanced access to and lower costs of credit.  It is of course 
quite appropriate to recognize and advocate for the potential economic gains from a 
Modern Principles-based legal regime.  But viewing such law reforms solely from that 
perspective holds secured transactions law reforms to an unreasonable, indeed unfair, 
standard. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Further investigation of transplantation processes for secured transactions laws 
(including the Modern Principles) may well reveal the weakness, even incoherence, of 
arguments supporting the status quo and in opposition to (or favoring deviation from) the 
Modern Principles.  This exposure may overcome resistance that otherwise would be 
successful absent careful public scrutiny.  The harmonization processes within 
UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and other organizations that have produced the Modern 
Principles provide some powerful evidence for this prospect.  To be sure, the same 
counter-arguments made (and that continue to be made) in the local law reform processes 
were heard throughout the harmonization and modernization efforts on the international 
level.  Open discussion and frank debates exposed, rebutted, and overcame weak and 
incoherent positions.125 
 Maybe—just maybe—reforms of secured transactions laws in some States that 
reject one of more of the most fundamental of the Modern Principles are appropriate 
adjustments that will, on balance, promote social welfare.  Further investigation and 
research concerning secured transactions law reforms should, of course, be open to this 
prospect.  But I am profoundly sceptical.  It is likely that the arguments that proved to be 
losers in the work on international harmonization and modernization of secured 
transactions laws are losers still.  As we ponder arguments supporting the need for 
adjustments and deviations from the Modern Principles to accommodate the asserted 
needs, culture, and particular circumstances of a State considering reforms, we should be 
 
125 A technical term used by some political scientists and others for such poor argumentation and reasoning, 
described by Merriam-Webster as ‘usually vulgar’, is ‘bullshit’ (defined as ‘nonsense; especially:  foolish 
insolent talk’). Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 13 July 2018. 
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mindful of the idea underlying the Modern Principles.  The international harmonization 
effort reached a consensus that the current laws of many States are inferior, ineffective, 
and inefficient and should be replaced.  Secured transactions laws, like laws in general, 
are not created equal.  Some work better than others. 
 But this scepticism about significant deviations from the Modern Principles also 
should be tempered in at least two important respects.  First, ‘second best’ approach 
adopted by a State as a political compromise may nonetheless reflect a substantial 
improvement over the legal regime that it replaces.  And progress sometimes—often I 
would think—proceeds only incrementally and along a winding path.  Perhaps the most 
important conclusion from Watson’s insights, although not unique, is that the law is 
perpetually in a state of flux.126 
 Second, these principles—while here bestowed with the appellation “modern”—
are (conservatively) more that 65 years old.127  They have seemingly been stubbornly 
immune to evolution or modification of a fundamental nature.  Even recently emerged 
significant artifacts of the Modern Principles—the Guide on the Implementation of a 
Security Rights Registry128 and the UNCITRAL Model Law—appear to be oblivious to 
the emerging Fintech129 advances, other than embracing 20th century legacy technology 
for registries.130  But one hopes that the energy and imagination that infused the processes 
that developed and implemented the Modern Principles will emerge and inspire further 
evolution and adjustments to these principles.  Recent publications that address registries 
offer some encouragement in this respect.131 
 
 
126 See eg Watson, Legal Transplants, 96 (transplantation is extremely common; most changes in legal 
systems result from borrowing). 
127 This dates the Modern Principles (perhaps arbitrarily, but not unreasonably) from the 1952 Official Text 
of the UCC. 
128 UNCITRAL, Guide on the Implementation of a Security Rights Registry (2013) (Registry Guide), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/security-rights-registry-guide-
e.pdf 
129 See G Walker, ‘Financial Technology Law—A New Beginning And A New Future’ (2017) 50 The 
International Lawyer 137: 
FinTech has emerged as a powerful new market force as a result of the coming together of a number of 
disconnected trends. Significant advances have occurred in the areas of computer and digital technology, 
the Internet, mobile telecommunications as well as economics and finance, which have transformed 
traditional areas of study and created important potential new business structures and operations. 
130 Registry Guide, fn 130 above, 31-33. 
131 See eg CW Mooney Jr, ‘Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the Future’ (2018) 81 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 1; T Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, ‘Digital Technology-Based Solutions for 
Enhanced Effectiveness of Secured Transactions Law: The Road To Perfection?’ (2018) 81 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 21; see also CG Bradley, ‘Disrupting Secured Transactions’ Houston Law Review 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3275263. 
